

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SECURITY COMMITTEE**

**SECOM-D-95  
1 August 1975**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence  
Community**

**SUBJECT : Proposed Letter of Instruction**

**REFERENCE : Your memo to USIB Committee Chairmen dated  
22 July 1975, Subject: Annual Reports and  
Evaluations of Committee Progress**

**Attached per your instructions in referenced memorandum  
is a proposed Letter of Instruction for the Security Committee.**



**Chairman**

**STAT**

**Attachment**

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee**

**SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction**

1. This Letter of Instruction identifies the major objectives on which I want you and your Committee to concentrate during the coming year in order to give practical and effective guidance to the intelligence community with regard to its security posture. It is most important that we continue to critically and realistically assess and modify if necessary the means of protecting our sensitive sources and methods. It is equally important that we provide the means of secure dissemination of the foreign intelligence vital to our country's welfare.

2. With regard to the inquiries being conducted by the Select Committees on Intelligence of the Senate and the House, I expect you to be of assistance to the intelligence community in effecting proper security arrangements during the period of the inquiries. Such arrangements should facilitate the Select Committees in conducting their inquiries and at the same time give due regard to the necessity for protection of our sensitive sources and methods of obtaining foreign intelligence. You should keep the community informed of security aspects so members can promptly and properly respond to requests from the Select Committees.

3. While I recognize the complexities of the compartmentation systems developed over many years to protect certain sensitive intelligence programs and projects, I want the Security Committee to be alert to possible improvements in security aspects of these systems. Various aspects of these systems are under review in the community and I may ask your Committee to analyze and make security recommendations as a result of such studies and I want you to be in a position to respond promptly to any such tasks.

4. In this connection I would like you to complete your study to determine the feasibility of a community-wide, computer-assisted compartmentation control system at the earliest possible date and forward your recommendations to me no later than October 1975.

5. I expect your Committee to complete the ongoing review of DCID 1/16, "Security of Compartmented Computer Operations," as rapidly as possible so that updated guidance is furnished the intelligence community with regard to compartmented computer operations. This should be submitted for my consideration by December 1975.

6. The analysis of available data as to penetration efforts directed against computer operations should also be expedited and a suitable paper on threat analysis should be prepared by December 1975.

7. In the technical countermeasures field, I would like you to study the adequacy of countermeasures equipment and bring to my attention any improvements you feel necessary with regard to the protection of intelligence community installations from foreign technical penetration.

8. I would also like you to analyze the research and development aspects in the security field to be certain there is no unavoidable overlapping of projects in this area. We must in this period of rising costs be certain we obtain for the intelligence community the necessary security aids with the lowest possible costs and ensure that the entire community is provided with the benefit of ongoing research and development to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

W. E. Colby